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Abstract 
This paper considers the relevance of the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida to geography’s engagements with both mainstream moral philosophy and 
poststructuralist theory. This relevance lies in the way in which their work unsettles 
the ascription of normative value to relations of proximity and distance. Distance is 
usually understood to be a medium of moral harm or indifference. In contrast, Levinas 
presents distance as the very condition of responsibility. Grasping the significance of 
this argument requires an appreciation of the temporality of responsibility and 
responsiveness that both Levinas and Derrida emphasise. They present an alternative 
way of understanding the relationality of subjectivity and social processes. Through a 
schematic exposition of key themes in Levinas’ work, prevalent understandings of the 
spatiality of relations are shown to harbour their own forms of indifference and moral 
harm. The full effect of Levinas’ reconsideration of the value of relations between 
proximity and distance is bought out in Derrida’s recent writings on hospitality. For 
both thinkers, there is no natural geographical scene for the cultivation of 
responsibility. Rather, their shared focus upon temporality emphasizes the degree to 
which responsibility is motivated in response to the activities of others. The 
implication of this argument is that critical analysis should be reoriented towards 
practices that shape individual and collective dispositions to acknowledge the claims 
of others.   
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“Responsibility remains a task of responsiveness” 
Stanley Cavell (1990, 25) 
 
I). DECONSTRUCTING PROXIMITY AND DISTANCE 
In both geography and moral philosophy, the tension between a partial ethics of care and 
an impartial ethics of justice is often mapped onto a spatial distinction between 
responsibilities to proximate others and responsibilities to distant others (see Chatterjee 
2003, Smith 1998). On the one hand, there is a set of arguments that ethical 
competencies are inevitably learned in situ, and that place serves as the necessary basis for 
any extension of concern over larger scales (Sack 1997). On the other hand, there is the 
argument that there is no good reason to privilege responsibilities to those who are close 
by (and by implication, those with whom one shares an identity). This argument is 
perhaps most famously developed by Peter Singer (1972), and has been invoked to argue 
for the extension of geography’s ‘scope of concern’ (Murdoch 2003). Both sets of 
arguments share an implicit understanding of proximity in terms of identity, shared 
interests, and partiality. Thus, the recurrent theme of ‘caring at a distance’ revolves 
around the question of whether concerns for people in close proximity can be 
transformed into active concern for distant strangers. Caring at a distance is supposed to 
be a problem because it is assumed that “distance leads to indifference” (Smith 2000, 
93).1 
This paper considers the contribution that the work of both Emmanuel Levinas and 
Jacques Derrida might make to geographers’ engagements with moral philosophy and 
ethical theory. This contribution lies, I will argue, in the way in which their work 
unsettles the usual ascription of normative value to proximity and distance. Levinas’ 
work has become central to the ethical turn in poststructuralism (see Garber et al 2000). 
It has also begun to attract detailed attention from geographers (Bridge 2000, Howitt 
2002, Popke 2003). Levinas’ phenomenology of care lends itself well to the problem that 
has come to serve as the paradigm of ethical reflection in geography, namely the question 
of how far moral obligations actually extend (see Corbridge 1998, Silk 1998, Smith 1998). 
Levinas’ work places considerable emphasis upon the ethical primacy of relations of 
proximity. But the value of this notion in his work does not depend on the annulment of 
distance, and nor is distance even understood as the primary source of moral harm. 
Firstly, then, Levinas provides an entry point for rethinking the equation of proximity 
with partiality, and of distance with impartiality. By extension, he helps us reassess the 
problem of how to reconcile an ethics of care with an ethics of justice. Secondly, I also 
want to demonstrate the extent to which any treatment of Levinas’ work needs also to 
consider Derrida’s inflection of that work. The relationship between these two thinkers is 
well-enough known these days. Levinas stands as one of the paternal thinkers who 
prefigured what we now recognise as poststructuralism. However, Derrida’s work is far 
from straightforwardly derivative of Levinas’. There is an oblique dialogue between the 
two that shapes the work of each one (see Bernasconi 1991). Finally, while asserting the 
relevance of this tradition of thought to geography’s concerns with moral philosophy and 
ethical theory, I also want to argue that a respectful consideration of Levinas’ and 
Derrida’s writings on responsibility throws into question some of the cherished 
assumptions of geography’s received interpretation of poststructuralism.  
Derrida’s (1999) recent reflections on Levinas’ legacy are concerned with questions of 
the reception of guests and generosity towards strangers – with questions of hospitality. 
Hospitality appears at first sight to be a geographical theme. The geographical 
interpretation of hospitality is encouraged by the connections made by Derrida and 
others between this idea and current political debates about migration, asylum, and post-
national citizenship (see Amin 2003, Ben Jelloun 1999, Derrida 2001, Rosello 2001). In 
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this paper, I argue that we should resist a temptation to read the theme of hospitality as 
immediately pertaining to geographical concerns. I demonstrate the extent to which what 
is most at issue in the encounter between Levinas and Derrida is the temporality of inter-
subjective relations. Figures of temporality – of memory, inheritance, anticipation and 
surprise - are central to the alternative, non-hierarchical evaluation of the value of 
proximity and distance that emerges in this line of thought. And the focus upon 
temporality is significant because it emphasizes the degree to which responsibility is 
motivated in response to the activity of others.  
 
II). ON THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF OTHERING  
In contemporary critical theory, and in particular in work inflected by poststructuralism, 
there is an axiomatic understanding of the ethics of identity and difference. This 
understanding depends on a critique of ‘essentialist’ understandings of identity. 
Essentialist understandings present identity as natural, stable, or freestanding. In contrast, 
anti-essentialist understandings consider identities to be malleable and constructed – 
through codes, practices, and performances. To be more precise, identity is constructed 
in relation to other identities, in a simultaneous process of identification with and 
differentiation from selected ‘others’. According to this view, if identity is relational, then 
identity-formation works primarily by excluding some element that takes on the role of 
the Other, setting up an image of non-identity that confirms the identity of the self or the 
collective community. But in turn, this excluded element always threatens to undermine 
the appearance of self-contained identity that it supports.  
This understanding presents identity-formation as a process of controlling boundaries 
and maintaining the territorial integrity of communities or selves. It therefore entails an 
automatic calculus of the rights and wrongs of different modes of relating. The 
assumption is that moral harm arises primarily through the failure or refusal to recognise 
the reciprocal and co-constitutive characteristics of subjectivity. This failure is often 
presented in terms of spatial exclusion or separation, that is, as working through the 
putting of certain things (e.g. people, nature, animals) at a distance. From this 
perspective, classical philosophical notions of moral agency can be criticised on two 
related grounds (see Popke 2003). Firstly, notions of moral agency and ethical autonomy 
apparently depend on the ‘othering’ of certain categories of person - on the grounds of 
class, gender, race, sexuality, and so on. This argument reiterates one of the maxims of 
poststructuralist theory. This is the idea that difference is the condition of the identity of 
subjectivity. Secondly, it is argued that the identity/difference, self/other relation is 
organized in fundamentally spatialized ways - around tropes of here and there, inclusion 
and exclusion, presence and absence, in-place and out-of-place. These two axioms of 
poststructuralist theory suppose that to develop values of mutuality, inclusion, and 
responsibility, it is necessary to bridge distance or extend the scope of recognition.  
This generic poststructuralist theory of cultural othering is prone to a series of 
conceptual and normative slippages. This follows from the tendency to run together two 
quite distinct understandings of otherness. One is based upon the empirical analysis of 
the ways in which identities are constructed through exclusion or denigration. The 
second is based upon a set of theoretical resources drawn in particular from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, in which the movement between identity and difference is understood to 
be ontologically constitutive of any and all subjectivity (Osborne 2000, 107-8). By 
running these two understandings of otherness together, the uncovering of exclusion 
becomes the taken-for-granted manoeuvre of critical analysis for poststructuralized 
geography, according to which the cultural other is necessarily posited as the unstable 
foundation of hegemonic identities. This conception remains true to a longer tradition of 
thought in which the relationship of Self and Other is contained within a circle of 
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recognition and mis-recognition, according to which a subject only exists in so far as it 
exists for another subject. At the level of normative evaluation, this sort of approach 
affirms openness over closure, inclusion over exclusion. But at the ontological level, it 
ascribes priority to closure and exclusion in processes of subject-formation. This generic 
poststructuralism is therefore condemned to reiterate the banal truism that all identities 
and institutions are founded on repression, or denial, or exclusion, and yet are always 
permeable to disruptions by these exclusions that define them.  
There is no good reason to suppose that the logic of exclusion that is essentialized by 
generic theories of cultural othering exhausts all the possible ways of relating to alterity 
(see Isin 2003, Oliver 2000). Lois McNay (2000, 3) neatly captures the problem with this 
prevalent conceptualisation of subject-formation:  
“Following a relational theory of meaning, the assertion of the subject’s identity is 
explained through a logic of the disavowal of difference; the subject maintains a 
sense of self principally through a denial of the alterity of the other. While this might 
be a foundational moment in the formation of coherent subjectivity, it does not 
provide a comprehensive explanation of all possible ways in which the subject may 
relate to the other or deal with difference. When this exclusionary logic is extended 
to explain all aspects of subject formation, it results in an attenuated account of 
agency which leaves unexplored how individuals are endowed with the capabilities 
for independent reflection and action such that their response, when confronted 
with difference and paradox, may involve accommodation or adaptation as much as 
denial. In other words, it leaves unexplained the capabilities of individuals to respond 
to difference in a less defensive and even, at times, a more creative fashion”.  
By essentializing the logic of exclusion as the ontological foundation of all modes of 
subjectivity, poststructuralist theory generates an epistemological and ethico-political 
impasse for itself. It becomes extremely difficult to either account for or to justify observed 
practices of accommodation, generosity, or solidarity from within the standard 
interpretation of cultural othering. In contrast to the theoretical axioms of received 
poststructrualism, I want to argue that a different model of relational subjectivity 
emerges when ones reads Levinas and Derrida alongside one another. In this alternative 
account, subjectivity is formed in opening-up towards otherness in a relation of welcome.  
 
III). THE HYPERBOLE OF ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In this section, I want to clarify what is most distinctive about Levinas’ discussion of 
otherness. Levinas criticizes what he argues is the long-founded tendency in Western 
philosophy to subordinate ethics to ontology and epistemic reasoning, so that moral 
responsibility is derived from a definitive knowledge or comprehension of Being. 
Rather than modelling human relations on structures of knowledge of some sort, 
which depend on relations of identity, Levinas argues that there is a structure of 
responsibility built into human relations that precedes other forms of relating such as 
knowing or perceiving. Levinas asserts the primacy of the ethical in human relations – 
this is what he means by ‘ethics as first philosophy’. But he presents the ethical 
relation as irreducibly asymmetrical. His argument holds that any attempt by a subject 
to rationalize or to calculate their obligations to others negates the ethical relation 
itself, by re-centering these commitments in the self-assured good conscience of an 
autonomous self. In contrast, Levinas’ account of the ethical relation affirms an 
absolute and inviolable responsibility for the Other. Subjectivity is formed in a 
radically passive relation of hospitality towards the Other (Levinas 1969, 168-174).  
By breaking the assumed connections between subjectivity, consciousness, and 
intention, Levinas’ account of ethical responsibility seems to render impossible 
‘responsibility’ as it usually understood. However, it might not be best to take Levinas’ 
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work too literally as an account of practical conduct. The guiding trope of Levinas’ 
account of ethical responsibility is hyperbole, that is, the “the systematic practice of 
excess in philosophical argument” (Ricouer 1992, 337-341). This observation suggests 
that Levinas is intent on recalling a forgotten dimension of human relations. Levinas 
goes so far as to suggest that this ethical substratum of human relating cannot be 
represented in the idioms of philosophical discourse at all. In response to Levinas’ claim 
to escape the vocabulary of classical philosophical reason, Derrida (1978, 111-113) 
observes that when it comes to discuss relations of difference, identity, otherness and 
alterity, Levinas’ Totality and Infinity inevitably has recourse to a spatial metaphorics 
of insides and outsides. Derrida argues that this spatialization of concepts is a problem 
for any account of ethical responsibility. This is because it reproduces a model in 
which subjectivity is founded through a hostile dynamic of incorporation and 
expulsion. On the face of it, Derrida reiterates the form of argument made against 
philosophical scepticism, suggesting that Levinas’ effort to elaborate ethics as first 
philosophy is self-defeating. The attempt to articulate a sense of ethics that escapes 
the philosophical vocabulary of ontology, knowledge and certainty necessarily makes 
use of that very vocabulary in order to remain comprehensible. Levinas’ allusive 
response to this argument is to argue that scepticism (and by implication his own 
thought), plays two distinct temporal registers off against each other: the Said, which 
refers to the content of a discourse; and the Saying, which refers to the event of 
enunciation itself (Levinas 1981, 167-171; see also Levinas 1991). The relation of 
ethical responsibility is not so much represented as it is shown in the performative 
temporality of the Saying. This is the scene for a singular experience of exposure 
without reserve to the Other.  
This sensitivity to the distinctive temporalities of relating is pivotal to grasping the 
normative significance of Levinas’ insistence on the asymmetry of the relationship 
between Self and Other. For Levinas, subjectivity is derived from a traumatic exposure to 
alterity. The scene of this exposure to the Other is the Face-to-Face relation. This is not 
understood to be a scene of reciprocity, but of radical asymmetry and subjection. The 
privileged modalities of ethical selfhood are suffering, vulnerability, persecution, or 
accusation. On these grounds, Levinas develops an account of subjectivity as always-
already responsible to and for the Other, prior to any calculation or reflection by a self-
conscious subject. The subject is, as he puts it, always One-for-the-Other (Levinas 1981, 
135-140). Feeling responsible or being obliged therefore arise ‘inadvertently’, in so far as 
they escape the intentionality of the subject (see Marais 1991). Rather than responsibility 
being actively chosen or consciously accepted by a subject, Levinas suggests that it only 
ever something that can be assumed in response to the approach of otherness. There is 
an irreducible degree of passivity inscribed within responsibility, a ‘passivity beyond 
passivity’ that is not a warrant for inaction, but is the very condition of responsiveness in 
the first place.   
This understanding of subjectivity as response-ability (see Oliver 2001) belongs to a 
broader tradition of thought that shares the idea that ethics “begins with the experience 
of a demand to which I give my approval” (Critchley 2000, 16). This tradition is 
characterised by a commitment to affirming the heteronomous constitution of human 
subjectivity. This emphasis helps us to see that Levinas’ usage of ‘the Other’ and 
‘otherness’ is not best read in the terms suggested by the generic analysis of the cultural 
politics of othering outlined in the previous section. It is important not to read the word 
‘Other’ in Levinas (nor indeed in Derrida) as straightforwardly referring to another 
person, another self, or indeed, another entity at all. It would be better to interpret 
Levinas’ ‘Other’ in strongly phenomenological terms, where this refers to the elaboration 
of the modalities through which entities appear. Understood in these terms, ‘otherness’ 
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refers not to what appears, but to a particular way of appearing (Large 1996, 49-50). The 
ethical relation, for Levinas, is a modality of appearing that has been forgotten or 
suppressed by the predominant norms for apprehending the self and the world. More 
precisely, in his account it is a mode of appearing that is not wholly cognitive, since 
‘otherness’ refers to the event of being placed under an obligation that is not modelled 
on either conceptual thought or sensory perception. This is a scene of exposure and 
rupture of the self. And it is important to underscore that, for Levinas, time is the 
medium of this ethical relation to otherness (1987b). A specific sense of temporality is 
privileged by Levinas – his emphasis is upon patience, postponing, and deferring. Or, as 
Critchley (1999a, 155) puts it, the emphasis is upon temporisation. These favoured 
temporal figures are suggestive of a sense of subjectivity that does not rely on a notion of 
active self-constitution, but is formed in a relation of radical passivity (see also Clark 
2003). Understood in this sense, otherness refers to the dimension of surprise that 
overtakes the self. Responsibility is therefore not understood as an attribute of an 
autonomous subject able to legislate obligations for itself. For Levinas subjectivity is an-
archic, by which he means that it is formed in a relation of obligation that precedes law, 
principle, or conceptualisation (Levinas 1987a, 127-139). And this is the source of the 
idea that ethical responsibility is assumed rather than accepted. Levinas suggests that ethical 
responsibility, as the withdrawn origin of subjectivity itself, is not formed in a relation of 
re-cognition, nor by calculating the validity of claims made on the self. Rather, 
responsibility begins in the absence of such criteria.  
 
IV). INTIMATE DISTANCE, STRANGE PROXIMITY  
Levinas’ thought encourages us to think more carefully about the precise meaning of 
assertions concerning the ‘relational’ qualities of identity, subjectivity, or community. The 
stake in post-Kantian philosophy is not whether subjectivity is relationally constituted or 
not. It is, rather, just how ‘relational’ subjectivity is to be understood (see Taylor 1995, 
76-78). As Gasché (1999, 7-11) observes, being-toward-another is the “essential 
peculiarity of relation”. In this light, Levinas provides a particular account of what being-
toward-another involves. He argues that from Hegel through to Husserl, the movement 
of mediation through which the identity of a subject is formed in relation to others is 
conceptualized in terms of a circuit of reciprocity that, in the final analysis, recuperates 
and destroys “the radical alterity of the other” (Levinas 1969, 35-6). For Levinas, by 
contrast, the Other is the figure for a relation to alterity that exceeds a reciprocal dynamic 
of dialogue or (mis-)recognition. Levinas’ account of ethical responsibility therefore turns 
on a very distinctive notion of the relational constitution of subjectivity, in which Self 
and Other relate across an unbridgeable distance, bound together in a relation of 
exteriority (Levinas 1969, 40-42). This is a relation almost without common terms, and 
therefore hardly a relation at all (Ricoeur 1992, 338-9). Levinas affirms the separation of 
Self and Other, a separation that is not to be mistaken for isolation. This idea that 
separation is formative of ethical responsibility is underscored by the way in which 
Levinas presents otherness not simply as difference, but as transcendence, as the 
apprehension “of existing apart, of being beyond and surpassing” (Joplin 1993, 222). 
This differential separation, whose medium is temporal as much as it is spatial, is the very 
condition of being moved by other people or events.  
Levinas’ discussions of proximity focus upon those kinds of intimate relationships that 
depend upon the maintenance of separation. Levinas’ privileged figures for describing 
this sort of relationship are tropes of contact and touch, such as the caress (Levinas 1981, 
81-94). But proximity is a temporal figure as much as a spatial one. More precisely, it is a 
figure of diachronic, differential temporality (ibid, 85). Proximity is presented throughout 
Levinas’ thought as a relation of non-synchronous and non-coincident approach. His 
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usage of proximity should therefore be distinguished from any sense of synchronicity, 
coincidence, or simultaneity implied by understanding this term simply in terms of spatial 
contiguity. Levinas refers to “the dehisence of proximity” (ibid., 84), to underscore the 
sense of rupture rather than fusion that this theme is meant to invoke. Thus, proximity is 
not a figure of communitarian familiarity, but a figure for the most intense and singular 
experience of difference. In this scene of proximity, the neighbour is also the stranger.  
In so far as this theme of proximity refers to scale (Howitt 2002), it is not spatial scale 
but numerical scale that is most at stake. In Levinas’ writing, proximity is the figure for 
the restless encounter between the One and a singular Other. As distinct from this 
ethical relationship of asymmetrical responsibility for the Other, justice enters the story 
with the introduction of multiplicity into the dyadic ethical encounter. It is here that 
responsibilities for generalised others arise, and here too that all those questions of 
comparison, measurement, synchronicity, equality, and reciprocity that Levinas excludes 
from the purity of ethical responsibility are re-admitted. In the ethical relationship, the 
subject is One-for-the-Other, impossibly indifferent to its own care. The entry of the 
‘Third Party’ into the scene of the Face-to-Face relationship transforms this ethical 
subject into an Other-for-others, that is, into an object of ethical responsibility. It is 
precisely this latter status that the One-for-the-Other is deprived of in the purity of the 
asymmetrical ethical relation (Levinas 1981, 158). The recurrent figure of proximity in 
Levinas’ thought therefore indicates the degree to which the guiding moral principle of 
this phenomenological ethics is the singular value of individuals as individuals. Levinas 
provides an account of human relations that affirms the absolute non-substitutability of 
individual persons. In proximity, “the substitution of the one for the other does not 
imply the substitution of the other for the one” (ibid.). The assumption of responsibility 
is not premised on reciprocity or symmetry. Or, to put it differently, the ethical 
relationship is characterised by a “surplus of my duties over my rights” (ibid, 159). In so 
far as Levinas affirms an un-abridgeable principle of infinite responsibility, it is because 
this sense of responsibility is, precisely, infinite - because it is a debt that cannot possibly 
be settled, and not because it is extends everywhere or to everyone. 
This account of ethics in terms of relations of asymmetrical delegation and substitution 
presents responsibility as a virtue that exceeds reciprocal obligations. In commentaries on 
this aspect of Levinas’ thought, it is common to suggest that the inviolable value ascribed 
to ethical responsibility for a concrete other must lead to a political impasse, in so far as 
practices of formalised justice that define responsibilities to generalised others seem to 
contravene the intense singularity and partiality that characterises the purity of the ethical 
relation. Levinas’ account of ethics and justice therefore has a certain degree of family 
resemblance to debates in moral philosophy concerning the consistency of an ethics of 
care with an ethics of justice, or of an ethics of virtue with an ethics of rights (e.g. Held 
1995, O’Neill 1996, Tronto 1993). As I have already intimated, there is an imagined 
geography underwriting these debates, in which the tension between what Slote (2000) 
calls ‘intimate care’ and ‘humanitarian caring’ is transposed into an opposition between 
caring up-close and the problem of caring at a distance. My argument here is that in so 
far as Levinas, and in turn Derrida, communicate with this set of debates, then they do 
so by disrupting the homologies often drawn between spatial proximity, partiality, and 
care on the one side, and spatial distance, impartiality and justice on the other.  
Levinas is careful to insist that justice, understood as the occasion of impartiality, 
comparison, and equality, does not simply degrade ethical responsibility (1981, 156-162). 
Without this relationship between multiple others the burdens of asymmetrical ethical 
response would be intolerable and lead to their own versions of ethical violence. 
Nevertheless, he does insist that justice on its own, stripped of the concerns of ethical 
responsibility, is abstract and violent:  
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“the contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied about the diachrony of two: justice 
remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close 
and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the 
closest” (ibid., 159).  
This passage indicates that, for Levinas, justice refers to a relationship in which the 
differential separation between singular persons is necessarily annulled. Relations of 
proximity - that is, relations in which subjects approach one another without merging or 
coinciding - are temporally distinct from relations of justice. The time of justice is 
contemporary, in the sense of aligning multiple subjects and claims into a relation of identity 
and comparison. The ethical relation is understood to be diachronous – it refers to a 
temporality of non-coincidence, patience, and surprise. For Levinas, the movement from 
the scene of ethical responsibility for the Other to a generalised responsibility for others 
(justice) needs to retain a reference to the experience of ethical proximity, otherwise it 
would be ‘justice only’. ‘Justice with responsibility’ is dependent on maintaining, rather 
than overcoming, the separation between the close and the far off. This separation is the 
condition of being affected, of being moved to responsibility.  
The gist of Levinas’ argument is to contest the idea that ethical responsibility could 
consist simply in the unconditional extension of care to generalised others. For Levinas, 
the ethical relationship is by definition restricted to the relationship of proximity with a 
singular Other. This argument is a little unsettling when misconstrued as an account of 
practical conduct. But it should probably be interpreted as an effort to dispossess the 
centred subject of philosophical reason of the privilege of deciding both its own 
commitments and the identity of those to whom concern will be extended. It is, in short, 
an effort to account for the very possibility of responsiveness without which the practice of 
responsibility would remain the benevolent dispensing of favours without any 
acknowledgement of the finitude of the self.   
 The question which remains, after this clarification of Levinas’ understanding of the 
temporalities of responsibility and justice, is just how to suppose that justice can be 
inflected with the trace of the ethical relation without annulling what is distinctive about 
the value of that relation in the process. Is this just a forlorn hope, dependent on a plea 
to good conscience? Or is this account of ethics just a regulative ideal, against which to 
judge the necessarily compromised actualities of worldly power?  
 
V). DISPOSSESSING THE SUBJECT OF GENEROSITY  
Levinas develops an understanding of ethics, responsibility, and otherness that does not 
fit the generic story about cultural othering discussed above. From this alternative 
perspective, subjectivity is constituted in relation to an exposure to otherness that comes 
as a surprise, as an event that overtakes the self-possession of the subject. Subjectivity is 
neither the derivative projection of a prior will-to-identify, and nor is it formed through 
differential exclusion. The reason for emphasising the temporality of responsibility is to 
underscore the idea that ethical concern arises through a capacity for responsiveness to 
specific appeals for care. However, as already suggested, this insistence on the intense 
partiality of responsibility seems to undermine the possibility of institutionalising modes 
of justice. Justice is supposed to be governed by values of universality, equal treatment 
and impartiality that seem to negate the normative core of the ethical relation as Levinas 
sketches it. Levinas certainly does not straightforwardly affirm ethics over justice, but 
there remains in his work an implicit prioritisation of the dyadic ethical encounter even 
as he insists on the necessity for the generalisations of justice.  
The next two sections show how Derrida deconstructs, in an ‘affirmative’ register, 
Levinas’ implicit purification of the ethical relation. If for Levinas, responsibility emerges 
in the proximity of the face-to-face relation, understood as a scene of intense separation, 
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then Derrida demonstrates that this relation cannot be contained at the scale of physical 
co-presence. In so far as the ethical proximity opened up in the Face-to-Face relation is a 
space of address in which the self is overcome by the Other, then the anonymity of this 
Other must be paramount. For Derrida, the space of such anonymous relations of 
address is typified by the drift of ‘writing’, where this refers to a spatiality in which any 
sense of convening together subjects who share an identity is sundered from the outset 
(see Barnett 1999).   
Derrida’s (1992) deconstruction of the gift relationship is the paradigm for 
understanding the ethical orientation of deconstruction. This reading of the logic of the 
gift is meant to expose the conditions of possibility and impossibility through which generosity 
works. Starting from the observation that authentic gift-giving is conventionally counter-
posed to the alienation of exchange-relations, Derrida proceeds to show that, on these 
grounds, gift-giving turns out to negate its own principle. As soon as a gift is given 
knowingly as a gift, the subject of generosity is always anticipating a return, already taking 
credit of some sort, if only for being generous. This relationship between giving and 
taking, anticipation and return, therefore inscribes the gift within a circuit of utilitarian 
exchange that it is supposed to exclude. On this view, the ethical content of the generous 
act is annulled in the very moment of its enactment. Derrida’s lesson seems to be that 
giving is not possible, at least not in any purity. An act of pure generosity, one that would 
vouchsafe any return at all, could not be knowingly or freely given, it could not be 
recognised as a gift by either party.  
It is important to underscore that this deconstruction of the gift does not take as its 
target a scene of non-recognition, of non-reciprocity, or of exclusion. Quite the contrary, 
the focus of critical attention is an exemplary scene of reciprocal inter-subjective 
recognition, one that might be supposed to typify a non-allergic relation between Self 
and Other. The difference that is not honoured in this scene of reciprocity is the radical 
difference of the future as a space of the unanticipated event, of surprise. This argument 
about the gift is just one version of a recurrent impulse in Derrida’s writing that attempts 
to disrupt understandings of human action that retain a strong elective affinity with 
values of mastery, sovereignty, and possession. The broader significance of this argument 
is, then, that established ways of thinking about the relational encounter between Self and 
Other – in terms of dialogical, reciprocal, dialectical, or symmetrical relations of co-
implication - might actually obstruct rather than advance the cultivation of ethical 
responses to otherness.  
Derrida’s deconstruction of generosity bears directly on the question of how, and even 
whether, to translate Levinas’ account of the ethical relation into an account of moral 
action and worldly justice. A crucial reference point for Derrida’s encounter with Levinas 
is the observed relationship between the grammar of the gift and the grammar of 
hospitality (see Benveniste 1971, 271-80). In reiterative readings of the theme of 
hospitality in literature, policy, and theology, Derrida finds that hospitality is ordinarily 
represented as a gift in the conventional sense, offered in exchange for something (for 
example, for good conduct, or respect for the law). Hospitality is therefore offered 
conditionally, out of a secure sense of self-possession. Just as with the deconstruction of 
the gift, Derrida’s reading of what he calls the ‘laws of hospitality’ finds them to be 
premised on a logic of un-relinquished mastery over one’s own space. This common 
sense understanding of hospitality therefore amounts to an ethics of tolerance. And 
Derrida suggests that tolerance depends on a form of paternalism rooted in mastery and 
possession, and that it therefore runs counter to the imperatives of ‘pure’ hospitality (see 
Borradori 2003, 127-9).  
This analysis seems to set up a clear opposition between two orders: tolerance, taken as 
a shorthand term for conditional hospitality; and pure, unconditional hospitality. 
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Tolerance is extended to a guest whose identity is already attributed. On the other hand, 
pure hospitality befalls the subject as a trauma, because it is a response to an 
unanticipated arrival, to a visitation without invitation. Derrida therefore presents invitation 
and visitation as two distinct but related dimensions of hospitality. They are distinguished 
as two different temporalities of arrival (Derrida 2002a, 362). The unexpected visitor, as a 
figure of alterity, overwhelms the self-possession of the subject. The idea that subjectivity 
is constituted in a passive relationship of welcome, one of unconditional hospitality, 
implies that responsibility is not straightforwardly an attribute of a subject at all. 
So is this where both Derrida and Levinas leave us - analysing the conditions of 
possibility of being ethical all the way down to their formal purity, thereby showing that 
putting ethical principles into practice is actually impossible? The impression seems to be 
that the ‘indissoluble but heterogeneous’ relationship between unconditional hospitality 
and conditional hospitality simply devolves into a relationship between the ideal and the 
practical. In this way, we appear to be led inevitably towards resolving the tension 
between a highly formalistic account of ethical responsibility and the practical demands 
of collective living by making both Levinas’ and Derrida’s account of responsibility into a 
regulative ideal (cf.Borradori 2003, 133-136). However, this is to presume that the 
difference that Derrida elaborates between conditional hospitality and pure hospitality, or 
the difference between invitation and visitation, must be read as a synchronous relation 
of opposition, negation, or paradox. In the next section, I want to argue that rather than 
simply affirming Levinas’ implicit prioritisation of unconditional responsibility over 
impartial justice, Derrida redistributes the relations between these virtues through a 
parasitical-supplementary analysis2 of the connections between the discourse of 
hospitality and the discourse of sovereignty. And this reveals deconstruction to be much 
more conservative in its ethical and political implications than is often supposed.   
 
VI). FINITUDE AND HOSPITALITY 
It is tempting to interpret Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality in terms of an 
opposition between ethics and politics, where these two serve as figures for intrinsic and 
instrumental value. The question of whether a new arrival should be interrogated and 
questioned, or whether they should be offered unquestioning welcome, seems on the 
face of it to be analogous to the difference between the ethical relation and justice 
(Derrida 2000, 27-9). On this reading, the conundrum facing any worldly inflection of 
deconstruction is how the ethics of hospitality (the scene for the unconditional obligation 
to welcome the Other without question) is related to the politics of hospitality (the realm 
in which hospitality is conditionally extended as a right to certain categories of person, 
implying an apparatus of laws, states, and borders). This question echoes Levinas’ 
distinction between ethical responsibility and justice. Some commentators are happy to 
present this distinction between the ethics and politics of hospitality as an aporia that can 
only be crossed at the cost of reducing the intrinsic purity of the ethical relation, 
contaminating it with the instrumental calculations of politics, law, and sovereignty (e.g. 
de Vries 2001). The ethical relation is thereby understood to be both normatively and 
logically prior to any collective form of related-ness, for which politics serves as the 
name. In these terms, the practical exigencies of political community require some form 
of closure, exclusion, and calculation. But these nonetheless offend against a norm of 
unconditional welcome that continues to serve as a principle of immanent critique of 
existing practices. On this interpretation, then, any ordered discourse of responsibility, 
organised infrastructure of laws and rights, or regulated arrangement of boundaries is 
thought to contravene a principle of unlimited responsibility towards otherness by 
introducing a degree of calculation into the practice of care.  
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As already indicated, the recurring theme of geography’s engagement with questions of 
moral philosophy and ethical theory has been the problem of caring for distant others 
(Smith 1998), or more broadly, of how far to extend the scope of moral concern, not just 
spatially, but also in terms of non-human beings (Whatmore 2003). Arguments around 
these issues tend to work on the principle that any restriction of concern is an expression 
of an allergic impulse to exclude others, an impulse that works by drawing boundaries 
and by putting ‘others’ at a distance. From this perspective, deconstruction is easily 
interpreted as affirming an unbounded responsibility for others, in so far as it is 
interpreted as providing a disobliging critique of the arbitrariness of seemingly water-
tight dichotomies. On the strength of this sort of interpretation, both Levinas and 
Derrida seem to recommend a ‘deterritorialization of responsibility’ (Campbell 1994), or 
an unconditional extension of concern to others in general. But the flip-side of this 
interpretation is that it renders deconstruction into a form of high-minded idealism, 
destined always to be disappointed by the stubbornness of worldly realities.  
We should be wary of translating the Levinasian account of responsibility or Derrida’s 
account of the laws of hospitality immediately into an ethics of irrecusable obligation to 
generalized others. If ethical responsibility is understood as an imperative to extend care 
to everyone or everything irrespective of identity, then it is made into a choice open to a 
subject to accept or reject. This presumes that responsibility is a kind of epistemic 
practice, precisely the idea that Levinas argues against. What is more, understood in this 
way, this model of responsibility is far too stringent in the degree of altruism its demands 
of ethical subjects. But more fundamentally, this understanding installs two forms of 
indifference at the heart of the account of ethical conduct. Firstly, it implies the complete 
malleability of the Self, able to slough off any and all existing commitments and relations 
at will, in favour of new ones. This implies an indifference to the web of relations into 
which any ethical subject is necessarily always-already woven. And secondly, in turn, it 
presumes that responsibility is accepted abstractly. This implies an indifference to the 
experience of being addressed by particular claims for acknowledgement.  
For these reasons, we should resist any temptation to map the relationship between the 
ethics of hospitality and the politics of hospitality onto a dichotomy between idealized 
unconditional responsibilities and their necessarily conditional implementation. My 
argument here is that Derrida’s mournful writings on Levinas’ legacy indicate that the 
implicit privilege accorded to the purity of ethical responsibility be reconsidered. In 
Derrida’s original engagement with Levinas’ thought, he posed the question of whether 
the notion of ethics as unconditioned hospitality and undetermined responsibility, before 
law or concept, could possibly be expected to inform any action without “negating and 
forgetting itself” (1978, 111). In his more recent writings on this topic, the implied 
opposition between ethical ideals and practical action that this question presupposes is 
itself subjected to the force of a deconstructive reading. Derrida uses the topic of 
hospitality to re-inscribe conditionality and unconditionality into a different relation, one 
that is not governed by either the rule of negation or the tragedy of ‘forgetting’ and 
‘disclosure’. The thrust of Derrida’s reading of Levinas is to find the latter’s account of 
the ethical relation insufficient not just for thinking about politics and justice, but also in 
terms of its own criteria of ethicality.  
Derrida engages in a characteristic double reading of Levinas, respectful and critical in 
equal measure. Firstly, he affirms Levinas’ account, according to which hospitality cannot 
properly be conditioned – pure hospitality consists of a welcome extended without 
condition to an unanticipated guest. Levinas would seem to imply that attributing an 
identity to the guest contravenes the imperative of unconditional welcome. But in the 
second movement of Derrida’s reading of Levinas, he suggests (Derrida 2000) that this 
imperative calls forth another, equally compelling one. In order to be hospitable, 
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hospitality requires that a guest be greeted, addressed, named as a singular individual. As 
Naas (2003, 159) puts it, hospitality requires that the guest be welcomed as a Somebody, 
not as a serialised nobody. Hospitality requires that one not be indifferent to one’s guest. 
This is not a distinction between an ethical imperative of unconditional welcome and a 
political imperative to impose conditions, borne out of the empirical necessity to 
institutionalise rules and regulations. Rather, it is a distinction between two equally 
compelling ethical imperatives. The imperative to extend unconditional welcome without 
question and the imperative to impose conditionality on any such welcome by attributing 
identity are of equal weight within the ethical drama of hospitality. And this implies a 
different placement of the conditional and unconditional dimensions of hospitality:  
“The problem is not that we can never live up to absolute, unconditional hospitality 
because we can never welcome everyone, because we must set limits to our 
hospitality. Obeying the law of conditions is not simply a concession to our finitude, 
to our limited capacities and resources, or else simply a concession to political 
expediency. It is recognition that hospitality, ‘real’ hospitality, consists in welcoming 
particular guests and not just anybody, particular guests and, as a result, not others” 
(ibid., 164).  
This reading of the laws of hospitality undoes the lingering sense of logical and 
normative priority of pure ethical responsibility that pervades Levinas’ work, as well as 
most commentary on it (ibid., 110). Accordingly, Derrida endorses the Kantian precept 
that right implies effectivity. He does so not simply as a pragmatic concession to worldly 
realities, but as an unbridgeable ethical principle called forward by the imperatives of 
‘pure’ hospitality itself: “a law that doesn’t exist effectively, a law that is not capable of 
ensuring, by force – by its force – that its decisions are respected, is not a law or right” 
(Derrida and Stiegler 2002, 75). 
This affirmation indicates the significance of Derrida choosing the theme of hospitality 
as a topic through which to address questions of responsibility. The common rendition 
of the normative significance of Derrida’s work holds that the deconstruction of 
conceptual dichotomies renders any form of boundary suspect. However, on the reading 
developed here, the intense suspicion of boundaries in generic poststructuralist theory 
can be seen to threaten to erase the very condition for any form of relation at all, and 
specifically for the form of responsibility valued by both Levinas and Derrida. This 
condition of responsibility is radical separation in the relation of proximity, a relation in 
which ‘passing by’ the other and being affected or moved to responsibility is made 
possible. To presume that distinctions, borders, or boundaries per se contravene 
principles of responsibility would threaten to install a degree of indifference into the 
understanding of responsibility that contravenes the specific sense of obligation that 
Derrida inherits from Levinas. In fact, Derrida (2000, 65) suggests that the complete 
erasure of boundaries would efface the threshold across which relating is made possible. 
Derrida’s reading of hospitality is an affirmation that the condition of possibility of 
responsible action lies in divisibility of borders and finitude of boundaries, but not their 
erasure (Derrida 1993; see also Derrida 1979). Thresholds are the very scenes for the 
drama of responsiveness, hospitality, and responsibility.  
It follows that the deconstruction of hospitality therefore has ambivalent implications 
for how we judge received discourses of sovereignty and autonomy. As was suggested 
above, hospitality is a virtue that depends upon retaining a semblance of both 
sovereignty and autonomy, not their negation. Derrida (1999, 32-33) insists that the 
absence of law, politics, or the state would threaten to unleash the double possibility of 
violence that inheres in the asymmetry of the ethical relation. Firstly, the affirmation of 
absolute asymmetry harbours within it the exposure of the self to harm. It implies that 
the ethical subject should be indifferent to its own happiness or well-being. Secondly, to 
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actually honour this singular responsibility to a concrete Other would threaten injustice 
by ignoring the claims of other subjects.  It is here, in the internal possibility of violence 
and injustice that remains undiminished within the apparently non-violent purity of the 
asymmetrical ethical relation, that Derrida critically addresses the Levinasian inheritance.  
Derrida’s reading of Levinas revolves around the classically supplementary motif of the 
parasite. Levinas is able to admit the necessity of justice to ethics without admitting that 
calculation, measurement, comparison must thereby be inscribed within the purity of the 
ethical relation of asymmetrical proximity. But from a deconstructive perspective, 
responsibility is necessarily ‘contaminated’ by law, system, and calculation, and this 
contamination is emphatically not understood as an unfortunate loss of ideal purity 
(Spivak 1994). Derrida argues that the shift from ethical responsibility to justice is not a 
contingent movement. It actually belongs to the supposed purity of the Face-to-Face 
relationship that Levinas privileges as the scene of responsibility (Derrida 1999, 110). 
Therefore, ethics-as-hospitality is always already ‘becoming political’. To put it another 
way, the border between the ethical and the political is not taken to be an indivisible limit 
(ibid., 99). Any idealized purity of unconditional hospitality is undone by the need for 
this imperative to become effective, and this is not merely a practical or empirical 
necessity. It is itself an ethical imperative (Derrida 2000, 79, 81). The ‘corruption’ of the 
unconditional law of hospitality is therefore not an accident. It is the opening up of an 
equally compelling imperative to develop effective, conditional laws of hospitality 
“without which The unconditional law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining a 
pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency, and of even being 
perverted at any moment” (Derrida 2001, 22-23).  
This reading of the internal necessity of organised power called forth by the apparent 
purity of ethical responsibility might seem to run counter to the general impression that 
deconstruction is unrelentingly disruptive of all systems, structures, and sovereignties. 
But deconstruction is actually a rather conservative line of thought. I mean this in the 
sense that it continues to respect the salience of inherited discourses of rights, 
sovereignty, justice, and so on, while also insisting on the equally pressing imperative to 
critically think through the limits of these traditions. In this respect, Derrida certainly 
expresses the hope that it might be possible to imagine the operation of unconditional 
imperatives without sovereignty (Derrida 2001, 59-60). But this expression of hope is not 
to be too quickly conflated with a disobliging critique of all forms of sovereign 
autonomy, whether personal or territorial. Derrida affirms the hope of re-ordering the 
territoriality of claims-making and obligations without abandoning the promise of 
responsibility to the an-anarchic chance of unmediated goodness between persons.       
 
VII). ACKNOWLEDGING OTHERNESS 
I have argued here that there is, in what has become poststructuralist orthodoxy, a 
tendency to derive the normative significance of relations of identity and difference from 
a story about the politics of cultural othering. In this story, the relational qualities of 
subject-formation are understood primarily in relation to a set of spatial tropes of 
exclusion, expulsion, and constitutive outsides. On this axiomatic understanding of 
difference, moral harm is primarily rendered by excluding or disavowing otherness.  
Having also determined that there are no certain criteria for evaluating knowledge claims, 
this understanding of the sources of moral harm is led to embrace a variety of cultural 
relativism that encloses us within our own moral communities, able to affirm pluralism 
only in terms of highly abstract principles of tolerance (Mohanty 1995).  
Assuming that that the philosophical critique of Western norms of autonomy and 
universality simply confirms the relational qualities of subject-formation is to miss the 
full force of these critiques. The key question is how to understand different modes of 
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relating. My argument here has been that, by reading Derrida and Levinas up against one 
another, one can glean an understanding of relational subjectivity that departs from the 
received reading of poststructuralist theory. The sense of temporal relating that is central 
to both Levinas and Derrida’s writings is systematically repressed by the continuing 
presentation of deconstruction as poststructuralist, that is, as turning primarily upon an 
spatialized tropics of insides and outsides, determination and contingency. This 
vocabulary reduces the conceptualisation of time to the succession of punctual moments 
held together by nothing other than hegemonic conventions or a vitalistic force of will.  
The alternative understanding of relational subjectivity outlined in this paper 
emphasizes the heteronomy of responsibility. It does so in order to de-centre the self-
assured subject of moral judgement. And the emphasis upon the temporality of being 
obliged, of being moved to respond, is crucial to this de-centering. For example, 
Derrida’s distinction between invitation and visitation indicates that the category of the 
Other in deconstruction is not primarily understood with reference to a position in 
space. The topic of hospitality is not simply a story about inclusion or exclusion. Rather, 
the figure of the unexpected guest, the arrivant, is in a relation of temporal approach. 
From this alternative perspective, subjectivity is formed in a temporised relation of 
responsiveness to the surprise of otherness.  
The question I want to end on is whether, by prising open the links between 
knowledge and action, Levinas and Derrida between them leave us only with a purely 
individualized and vitalistic model of ethical or political action (see also Barnett 2004). 
This view would hold that the continuing imperative to act in the world is sustained only 
by the cultivation of a wholly autonomized sense of existential authenticity. In the 
tradition of thought indebted to deconstruction, there is certainly a resilient strain of 
thinking that embraces the pathos of what Derrida calls ‘undecidability’. At its simplest, 
and most formal, undecidability points to the dual observation that decisive action always 
involves the suppression of certain possibilities, and that the outcomes of any decision 
are not completely guaranteed in advance. In suggesting that this idea is not quite so 
novel as is sometimes supposed, Prendergast (2000, 76) suggests that the interpretation 
made of this maxim “depends on how the point about the absence of secure foundations 
is made and how its implications are handled”. With this in mind, one can identify two 
ways of interpreting the philosophical critique of foundationalism, of which 
deconstruction is just one variant. According to one way of handling the absence of 
secure foundations, it remains necessary to act, to decide, but this is rendered as a wholly 
personal act of blind volition. This rendition of undecidability is strongly supported by 
Derrida at his most messianic and Kierkegaardian. It makes ethico-political decisions into 
acts of pure faith, where faith is itself understood as necessarily blind and impenetrable 
to reason (e.g. Derrida 2002a, 40-101). This is the implication of the Derridean 
incantation that the ‘madness of decision’ is necessarily made in the ‘night of non-
knowledge’.  
But perhaps this overdoes things a little, as well as giving a little too much credence to 
Derrida’s own self-dramatization of the implications of deconstruction. Maybe the 
critique of foundationalism should be interpreted in more mundane ways.  If everyday 
practices are not strongly grounded in an epistemological way, then this does not imply 
they are infinitely malleable. Perhaps it means that their observed durability is due to 
their being embedded in habitual routines that might be extremely difficult to change (see 
Zerilli 2000). Or it might just mean that the experience of living without foundations 
does not need to be disclosed, nor that its implications are especially radical. Perhaps 
living with doubt is ordinary. 
In short, there is no need to presume that the limitations of certain knowledge as a 
model of human relating justifies a tragic retreat into individual pathos, enclosed cultural 
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relativism, or invocations of an aestheticized radicalism. The insistence on the asymmetry 
of ethical responsibility in both Levinas and Derrida is indicative of their endeavour to 
elaborate ways of relating which are made possible by the absence of criteria of certainty. 
Herein lies the importance of affirming the sense of responsibility as something assumed 
rather than accepted. As Critchley (1999b, 285-6) puts it, the limit of certain knowledge is 
the point at which considerations of certainty end and questions of trust, fidelity, and 
sincerity begin. And in this respect, we can see that the implications of the critique of 
foundationalism in either ethics or epistemology are not really radical at all. They just 
require reading old problems in new and less tragic ways. As noted above, Levinas’ 
response to Derrida’s original reading of Totality and Infinity was to suggest that 
scepticism, as the implied mode of relating to the world that distinguishes much of the 
Western philosophical tradition, should be redeemed rather than rejected. The intuition 
of separateness that underwrites the sceptical attitude remains of value precisely because 
it implicitly acknowledges styles of relating that cannot, in the final analysis, be modelled 
on either certainty or contingency. In this argument, Levinas’ work converges with that 
of Stanley Cavell (see Hammer 2002, 142-147). Both share a redemptive attitude towards 
philosophical scepticism, the moral of which, for Cavell (1979, 241), is that “the human 
creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of 
knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing”. For Cavell, what exceeds knowledge 
in human relations is what demands acknowledgement. Acknowledging refers to a mode 
of relating to others that supplements the traditional privilege accorded to knowledge as 
the primary medium for relating to the world and others. Acknowledgement is therefore 
best understood as an ‘inflection of knowledge’ that arises in relation to appeals to which 
the appropriate response is not recognition, but rather the acknowledgement of 
suffering, the showing of sympathy, or just listening (Cavell 2002, 238-266).  
If Levinas and Derrida indicate that subjectivity is formed in a temporised relation of 
response to otherness, we can now splice this idea together with Cavell’s distinction 
between knowing and acknowledging. Accordingly, responsibility would be understood 
as being formed in a mode of responsiveness to claims for acknowledgement (of pain, or 
suffering, distress, etc.) rather than mere recognition (as the same as you, or as wholly 
different from you). And this also implies that subjectivity is not always and everywhere 
organised through modalities of exclusion, hostility, or anxiety. The idea of 
acknowledgement takes us beyond choosing between a false universalism or an 
indifferent relativism. It does so by placing the emphasis upon the constitutive receptivity 
of selves or communities to otherness.  
And one of the more important implications of the deconstructive reading of Levinas’ 
notion of proximity developed in this paper is that there is no reason at all to suppose 
that claims for acknowledgement necessarily takes place in a space of contiguity or 
propinquity. Proximity refers to any scene of being addressed by the appeal or accusation 
of the Other. Derrida’s original point against Levinas’ Totality and Infinity is that, in its 
own terms, for the ethical dimension of the Face-to-Face encounter to have any force as 
an imperative, then it must be breached from the start by the possibility of an 
interruption or distancing that exceeds this scene of One-to-Other relating. Derrida’s 
affirmative deconstruction of Levinas re-inscribes the singularity of the ethical relation, 
now understood as always already traversed by a spacing towards anonymous addressees, 
to third parties. The either/or choice between equally compelling, undecidable ethical 
imperatives – to honour one’s responsibility for a singular Other or to generalised others 
- is thereby thrown forward into spaces of public relating which make possible the 
temporalization of responding, representing, witnessing, judging, deciding, giving 
reasons, and justifying to others  (see Barnett 2003, 2004).  
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The reading of Levinas and Derrida developed in this paper therefore implies the re-
orientation of our attention towards the myriad practices through which dispositions 
towards public acknowledgement of the claims of others are worked up and maintained.  
This paper has insisted on thinking of relationality in temporal as well as spatial terms, in 
order to maintain the sense of separation without which any notion of relation loses its 
force. This insistence has been informed by a conviction that this emphasis on separation 
better allows for the analysis of power as it is actually embedded in everyday life. It does 
so by opening up two sets of questions. Firstly, it restores a sense of the agency of those 
‘others’ to whom responsibility, care, or justice might need to be extended, by focussing 
upon where appeals for concern, justice or care come from, and how they are articulated. 
Secondly, it brings into view a set of questions about the differential capacities and 
dispositions of individual or collective actors to be affected by and moved to respond to 
certain claims and not to others.3 Developing this critical agenda requires laying aside 
both the orthodoxies of generic poststructuralism (caught as it is in the bind of a circular 
model of cultural othering), as well moral philosophy’s persistent binaristic framing of 
distance as an impediment to responsible action.  
 
Notes 
1. For a counter-argument to the primacy often accorded to local relations and to place 
in discussions of the sources of ethical concern, see Massey (2004).   
 
2. According to the ‘strange logic of the supplement’, what appears to be a secondary, 
unnecessary, or superfluous addition to a seemingly authentic and natural form (i.e. a 
parasitical element) turns out to be necessary and essential to it, marking the “the 
originality of the lack that makes necessary the addition of the supplement.” (Derrida 
1976, 214). 
 
3. For a contemporary account of ‘the politics of responsibility’ that builds on some of 
the theoretical resources outlined in this paper, see Young (2003).   
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